Towards Peaceful Multicultural Society

Conference on Building Peace and Prosperity through Integration in Europe

2009-02-04T19:43:00.000-08:00

The conference is a yearly event focusing on different and up to date issues on Europe. As the goal is to draw as many participants as possible, the first conference will focus on building of peace and prosperity through integration in Europe. The discussion of this broad theme will be divided into more specific topics of the panel sections.

We would like to invite academics and practitioners interested in European studies to compose papers to the following subtopics:

1. European integration in historical perspective:

Before taking the organisational shape that it has now, the process of European integration went through several stages. Starting with functional cooperation in the field of coal and steel, the European Union developed to become one of the most integrated regional organisations in the world. The positive outcomes of those first steps of integration pushed European states to pursue policies that would lead to a common market and even for some countries a common currency. To achieve this institutions like the European Commission and the European Parliament were formed which also try to lead the political integration of Europe. Every step of integration was shaped by the surrounding historical context, formed by the economical and political dynamics on the local, regional and international level. The ESCE (European Community for Coal and Steel) as an example was formed after World War II to prevent future wars between Germany and France. If we want to understand the way Europe looks today we have to explore the paths that have been shaping the continent. We will in this topic look at question such as: How did the historical context shape European integration? How did regional and global events shape the European integration process? How do political and economic developments of the past influence the current state and the future of European integration?

2. Political and economic implications of the European integration (this topic has three subtopics)

i. Economic and monetary integration: Economic integration has been the push factor of political integration in Europe and has transformed Europe into a highly interconnected economic area. The furthest step regarding economic integration has so far been the conclusion of an economic and monetary union for the member countries of the European Union and the adoption of a joint currency by 12 countries. Under this subtopic we would like to look at questions such as: What is and has the relationship been between economic and political integration? What were the successes and what the failures of economic integration? Which challenges had to be overcome to achieve economic integration?

ii. European politics and policy making: In this subtopic we will take a look at the policy making processes in Europe, with a special focus on the European Union but not excluding politics and policy making in other regional and international organizations in Europe (OSCE, NATO, …) and at European politics in general. Another topic would be to look at how integration shaped European politics and on how European politics shaped European integration.

iii. European security policy and external relations: This subtopic is dealing with external and internal security issues concerning Europe. Under this topic we will discuss topics ranging from immigration, crime, terrorism, nuclear proliferation to European countries and regional organization’s relations with Russia, the United States, the Middle East, …

3. Challenges to European Integration

Only by following the news in the last half a year we can find a number of issues that are analyzed as major challenges for the European Union and the European integration process in general. Might it be the Irish rejection of the Lisbon treaty, the conflict between Russia and Georgia or the current financial crisis, these and many more challenges are often pinpointing at the shortcomings and problems that the European integration process is facing. Under this topic we will though look at a variety of challenges that the European integration process is facing, both coming from inside the European polity as well as challenges coming from outside and on how European countries and Regional Organizations have responded to those challenges in the past and maybe will handle in the future.

4. Learning from European integration: The EU as a model for Southeast Asian integration?

Compared to Europe the regional integration process in South-East Asia is progressing rather slowly. More then 40 years after the foundation of ASEAN in 1967 and we can not show many major developments. The only mayor step of integration has been the conclusion of the AFTA (Asean Free Trade Area) agreement in 1992. This step will create a common market via the ”Common Effective Preferential taiff intra ASEAN, which will be 0-5 %. Eventhough the integration process in South-East Asia is progressing slowly the ASEAN governments have layed out their vision for ASEAN in 2020. The vision includes the ambitious plan to create an ASEAN Community which is based on three pilliars: Asean Economic, Security and Social-Cultural Community. Even if this vision shows the will of ASEAN leaders to foster further integration, more concrete steps will be needed to achieve this mission. Factors like uneaven levels of economic and human development, different political systems, a history of past conflicts, unresolved border questions have prevented ASEAN from deeper integration in the past. In this topic though we will look at questions such as: Inhowfar could the European organisational model be adapted by ASEAN? How can the experiences of European countries with integration be transfered to South-East Asia?

Selected papers will be presented by the author during the conference which takes place the 16th and 17th March 2009 in Yogyakarta as well as published after the conference. Papers will be accepted in both English and Bahasa Indonesia.

Timeline:

1. Please send in an abstract of your paper until the 5 February 2009 (for details see below).

2. The selection committee will announce the selection of papers until latest 7February 2009.

3. The deadline for the submission of the paper is the 28 February 2009. Papers submitted after this deadline might be excluded from the selection process.

4. The selected papers will be presented by their authors during the 1st Conference on European Studies, the 16 and 17 March 2009.

Selection Criteria

The selection committee will rank the abstracts according to following criteria:

· Relevance of the paper to the proposed subtopics

· Academic relevance of the paper

· Practical relevance of the paper

· Diversity of contributors and contributing institutions

Abstract and Paper Guidelines

Please follow the following guidelines when writing your abstract and paper

Please send Paper outline and Paper (Final Version) according to the following specification

* Format: e-mail attachment
* Word processor: MS Word, file format: RTF
* Document name: Use your last name and first initial of your first name, eg. Smithb
* Please send to: convention_europeanstudies@yahoo.com

http://s1hi.fisipol.ugm.ac.id/res/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26

Aceh committed to peaceful vote in 2009

2009-01-05T05:09:00.000-08:00

Ridwan Max Sijabat , The Jakarta Post , Jakarta | Mon, 07/28/2008 12:07 PM | The Archipelago

Leading political parties and local authorities in Aceh have agreed to peacefully conduct next year's legislative election.

The commitment was made during a meeting organized by the Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh (CoSPA) in Banda Aceh over the weekend.

Attending the meeting were four officials of the government-run Forum for Coordination and Communications for Aceh Peace, four former members of the now-dissolved Free-Aceh Movement (GAM), Aceh Vice Governor Muhammad Nazar, chief counselor Tgk. Zainal Abidin, Iskandar Muda Military commander in chief Maj. Gen. Soenarko, Aceh Police chief Insp. Gen. Rismawan and several other prominent Acehnese figures and local and international observers.

During the meeting, Bahtiar Aly of the University of Indonesia and Chairman of the Independent Election Commission (KIP Aceh) Abdul Salam Poroh thanked the six local parties recently ruled eligible to contend the 2009 legislative election for their commitment.

They also called on the parties to team up with national parties to ensure their success in the legislative election.

"If the election proceeds accordingly, the province could be a globally acclaimed model for resolving conflict," he said.

CoSPA members said a forum for political parties should be established to uphold democracy and peace during the election.

"Before the legislative election, all political parties, including local ones, should promise and make a joint commitment to ensure the election is a success," CoSPA Chairman Azwar Abubakar said Saturday after the meeting.

Azwar also called on party factions to expand their horizons in developing democracy in the country's most northern province.

"Besides, the Independent Elections Commission (KIP) should regularly evaluate the election process phase by phase by involving all political party leaders so that all problems can be solved before they are allowed to disturb the election.

"Also, to show their commitment to ensuring a peaceful election, political parties must take harsh action against any internal faction that violates election regulations," he said

The KIP should be vigilant in their processing of legislative candidates to ensure no criminals are allowed to enter the government, he said.

When queried on the media's role in the election, Azwar said journalists should not exploit conflicts or risk jeopardizing peace through hype.

"The media could run human interest stories and expose Aceh's unique values for the sake of democracy," he said.

Last week, an alliance of local NGOs expressed their fear that conflicts would break out in the region in the build up to the election.

They said a bylaw on political parties was insubstantial as it did not require that parties meet the needs of the public or take into account the people's political aspirations.

The NGOs cited as an example for poor regulations a recent conflict involving national and local party factions in Sigli.

The KIP has approved ten local parties and announced six eligible parties for the legislative election. They will compliment the 34 national parties that have already been verified by the General Elections Commission.

Kontras Aceh executive director Asiah Uzia said the absence of a special court to arbitrate unresolved human rights abuses and the encumbered management of conflict victims would undermine voter turn-out in the election.

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/07/28/
aceh-committed-peaceful-vote-2009.html

Violent jihadism boasts a new face

2008-12-05T21:59:00.000-08:00

The Jakarta Post, December 5, 2008 12:56 PM

Badrus Sholeh , Opinion

Based on online and TV news in Indonesia, Jihadists have been successful in shaping the "positive" image of their activism. Attacks conducted over the last decade are portrayed as the attempt to struggle against the pressure of the West and ruling governments, which they call thaghut, a term allowing them to fight under the name of God.

Before the execution of the Bali bombers, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the spiritual leader of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), and now the leader of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), delivered a message on the status of the bombers on the Internet through YouTube. Ba'asyir argues that the three bombers are eligible for the highest reward from God for their actions, which Ba'asyir claims was jihad.

Ba'asyir is not the only jihadi leader using cyber facilities to deliver propaganda. Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi and Aiman Al Zawahiri of al-Qaeda have used cyberspace to propagate their programs and messages. In Indonesia, blogging is also used by radical, violent communities to promote their ideas of jihad. Cyberspace and print media were also effective instruments for the Bali bombers, turning them into very popular and "inspiring pioneers" among radical Muslims.

Before their execution on Nov. 9, 2008, the Bali bombers became celebrities, enjoying publicity through the Indonesian and international media. Some interviews by radical print magazines, such as Jihadmagz and Sabili, constructed a positive image, with more Indonesian Muslims sympathizing with them before publication.

No wonder, the bombers' funerals were attended by more than 2,000 visitors from all parts of Java and some other Indonesian regions. They were visitors from Afghan veterans, radical organization members, Jihadist school students and the bombers' neighbors in Lamongan, East Java, and Serang, Banten.

The silent majority of moderate Muslims will lose their space preserving plurality and tolerance in the long term if they do not take more action to fight against radical jihadism. Democracy and freedom enjoyed by all Indonesians after the collapse of the New Order will turn into a nightmare if the government and the majority of moderate Muslims do not solve the problem immediately.

Fawaz A. Gerges (2005), the chair of International Affairs and Middle Eastern Studies at Sarah Lawrence College, argues that radical jihadist intend to combat the "far enemy" as part of their global Jihad. The war, therefore, is between the solidarity of Muslims in Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine against the West. But later they will shift their fight to the "near enemy".

According to interviews and statements by Bali trio and other jihadi leaders showing, they will fight against the near enemy, Muslims in Indonesia, who are against their agenda.

Now is the period of their consolidation. They are strengthening their ideology and recruiting more people under the umbrella of radical organizations. The quality of support has more meaning than the numbers. According to the survey of LSI (2007), the number of JI, Indonesian Mujahiddin Council (MMI) and FPI supports increased significantly between 2005 and 2007.

In rural and urban Indonesia, more Muslims have changed their minds, sympathizing with the ideologies and struggle of radical communities. The ongoing financial crisis and the chronic disease of corruption have become effective ways to attract people the caravan of jihad and radical groups.

The Nobel laureate Amartya Sen (2007) argues that the existence of radical jihadists and their struggle is part of expressing identity and the richness of Muslims. More needs to be done to counter terrorism than just imprisoning criminals. Interfaith and multicultural dialogue as well as the global agenda to decrease poverty have to be proponents of policies throughout the world. It will be a more powerful way to finish building the image of peace for the world against the attempt of violent, radical groups.

The writer is a lecturer of the Department of International Relations, Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), Jakarta.

Source:http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/12/05/
violent-jihadism-boasts-a-new-face.html

Peace Journalism: Some Notes

2008-11-23T09:05:00.000-08:00

The dynamics of conflicts in Indonesia were influenced by media coverage. Journalists are forefront of peace buildings. For instance, the existence of attacks in Maluku conflicts from 1999 to 2002, a lot of Muslims in Java and South Sulawesi voluntarily joined the Jihad groups to fight against Christians in Maluku and Poso after reading media coverage, which were biased and provocative. Peace Journalisms were needed and challenging in regions of Indonesia.

Therefore, it is crucial needs in Indonesia to discuss among journalists, who have had experience in covering social conflicts and how they supported peace building through journalism. This peace journalism workshop will furthermore find lesson learned of social conflicts in Indonesia, in comparison to the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia.

Conflict sensitive journalism is crucial to preserve neutrality of reporting and analyzing any cases in the conflicts. However, journalists are often having challenge in take priority in reporting conflict. In Maluku for example, local journalists found very low salary from their media company, and easily utilized by local politicians and other vested of interest bodies in producing biased media coverage. Therefore, some reports can be very provocative, and become instruments to raise the conflicts. Similarly, local politicians involved in conflict of Poso pressured some journalists in reporting some sensitive issues. They prefer to hide the truth to preserve their life in the conflict regions. Bribery, low salary and safety are main concerns of journalists in the conflict regions.

Asean Community, Civil Society Role

2008-11-01T07:19:00.000-07:00

by Badrus Sholeh

Asean Charter agreed by Asean members needs strong supports from civil society towards Asean community in 2015. The diversity of Asean cultures and religions is one of the challenges of the community. Robert Hefner argues that Asean is the largest multicultural community compared to European Union and other groups of states community. Each Asean country has hundred ethnic and language groups,and all world religions (and many local beliefs).

Up to now, people in each Asean country still think about their own country's economy, politic and culture. I argue that it is because of the difficulties of people to communicate each other. The varieties of languages in Asean countries make impossible for people to talk among countries. European Union people mostly speaks in English. If Asean community use Malay as one of important official langauge, Thai and Philippinos will have different language to talk. Moreover, the gaps of economy have long burdens of Asean leaders to implement Asean community.

Globalization has actually turn out the community in the region to reach cross border's people. Blogging is among the new means of people to communicate to people all over the world. There are tens or may be hundreds of free-made blog, which has been created by people to see each other. Friendster, multiply and blogspot are among popular citizen journalism which are commonly used by hundred millions people all over the world.

In many countries, blogging has become an effective means of politicans to communicate their ideas on some urgent issues to their community, and a medium of critique of people to government policy. In Malaysia for example bloggers discuss varieties of issues, which are actually very sensitive and will not be written by government-controlled media. Because of the riots of 1969 trauma, government under BN dominant leadership continue to manage racial issues. However, Malay people have interact each other through blogging. How about Indonesia?

Blogging is also used by Indonesian politicians to promote their views and ideas on politics, economy and social development. bangakbar.com is among popular blogs which got significant visitors. However, Indonesia is left behind Malaysia on blogging. Many Malay politicians' blogs are visited by thousands people per day. Dr.M blog is the most popular blog written by former Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad, which is visited in average 50,000 people per day.

To Win The Heart of People from Violent Jihad

2008-07-25T08:14:00.000-07:00

Detachment 88 commander, Brigjen Surya Dharma stated in a seminar conducted by Indonesian Council for World Affairs 15 July 2008 that Indonesian counter terrorism in Indonesia needs comprehensive policy integrated Indonesian and International Police and security, government and civil society organizations. The signifiant numbers of terrorist detainees in Indonesia, almost 500, approved the success story of Indonesian government in fighting against terrorism. However, as suggested by Dharma, the approach of counter terrorism expects more than just security process but covering broader aspects: economy, education, psychology, and culture. A group of former detainees concerns on this issue argues that economy and education are very crucial for solving the problems of violent Jihadist in Indonesia. Although some scholars and surveys state that poverty is not the main reason of terrorism activities, but it is important consideration. Hundred detainees who spent their life in prisons for many years between 1 to life sentence have different stories. Many of their families get great support from their comunity- small circles of violent Jihadists. By results, their family and the detainees will continue their commitment in violent Jihads. Moreover, some of them continue their involvement in stronger and more committed in terrorist underground movements. They would like to refuse some judgement from the active group that detainees have been inviltrated by Police and government, which they consider as their enemy. To prove it, they commit in harder and stronger role in violent Jihads.

On the other hand, many of the former detainees who have more independent role in Jihad activities attempt to involve in informal programs of Police, terrorism rehabilitation. Compared to the similar programs of conter indeology and counter terrorism conducted by Singapore for JI members and Saudy Arabia for Al Qaidah link of groups, which are successful involving government and Muslim community, Indonesian role in counter ideology and counter terrorism is left behind. Bigjen Surya Dharma felt that Police can only work in dealing with security, and have no capacity in other parts of counter terrorism. The existence of Tim Penanggulangan Terrorism (TPT) involving mainstream Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama and other Muslim organizations coordinated by Indonesian Ulama Council founded soon after Bali Bombing Two in 2005 does not touch the basic needs of counter terrorism. According to some members of the team that they have organized some meetings and publish some books, which only touch counter ideology in very small parts. Their publications are not available for public, which need broader and extensive role of Indonesian Ulema Council, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah and other groups. People still confuse of the true meaning of Jihad and their ambivalence of violent Jihadists, which are popularly known as posive based on publications of Jihadist magazines and Al Qaidah writers transaltions.

Time for peace coalition

2008-06-26T19:59:00.000-07:00

Badrus Sholeh , Jakarta | The Jakarta Post, Thu, 06/26/2008 10:39 AM | Opinion

The second World Peace Forum, being held jointly by Muhammadiyah and the Cheng Ho Multi Culture Trust and supported by the Center for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilizations (CDCC), is currently taking place in Jakarta from June 24-26. With the strategic and timely theme, "Addressing Facets of Violence: What can be Done?", this is a very momentous event for Indonesia, and especially the host Jakartans, where violence just occurred earlier this month.

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) attacked peace activists under the banner of religion (Islam). The attack is just one of many severe violent acts in the decade of post-New Order Indonesia. Religious radicalism and violent jihadist groups have grown significantly, enjoying the freedom and young democracy in the country. What should Muhammadiyah and the government do after the international peace dialogues?

The peace forum has helped to revive the image of Indonesia away from being new hub of radical movements and toward a tolerant and moderate country. This image development is very significant to maintain not only our strategy for foreign policy but also to reconstruct the new Indonesia. A new Indonesia where democracy is peacefully implemented and people preserve multiculturalism and pluralism as the identity of Indonesia, as agreed by the nation's founders in 1945.

Muhammadiyah, Indonesia's second-largest Islamic civil society organization after Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), plays a very significant role in supporting peace. This is very strategic for Muhammadiyah, which initiates the peace by making coalitions with the West.

In this forum, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende along with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presented very good messages of peace. The coalition is an important circle of peace building, which is imperative in this period of world transition.

This year, Nahdlatul Ulama will also manage an international forum for peace coordinated by the International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) which will be attended by World leaders as well. Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama have to be supported by the government and the international community to preserve peace in the region.

In this sense, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, as the largest civil society organizations in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, have played strong roles in peace building.

The international cooperation is now challenged by the rise of radicalism and terrorism, which some people regard as "simple" and "not dangerous". The killings in Maluku and Poso, and bombings in Indonesia and the rest of the world, conducted by terrorist groups grow from the spirit of radicalism and religious militancy.

According to the research of LP3ES (2007), the numbers of radical groups involved in violent jihad are very small, not more than 1 percent of Indonesian populations. Of 10,000 Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, around 200 are introducing radical jihad curriculum.

Hence, the quantity of radical groups is much smaller than mainstream moderate and tolerant groups. However, it will continue to grow if government and civil society of Indonesia and the world do not take actions to develop a peaceful Islam, supporting interfaith and intercultural dialogues and endorsing good education for poor people.

LSI polling in 2007 on the commitment of Muslims to sharia implementations were understood in a variety of ways by people. When they are asked to conduct sharia as part of their daily Muslim activities, the number of voters of sharia implementation is very significant.

However, when they are asked what they think of hudud (cutting hand) of criminals, the number of proponents is very low. People misunderstand the meaning of sharia, and they have actually implemented it in their daily life as part of the culture. The peaceful Malay culture of Islam is a good assimilation between Middle Eastern Islam and Southeast Asian culture.

Mainstream Muslim civil society organizations have to unite and continue making coalitions for preserving peace and strengthening their role in teaching moderate and tolerant Islam. This is one of the tasks for the participants of the World Peace Forum.

The writer is a lecturer of the department of international relations at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta. He can be reached at bsholeh@yahoo.com

Matters to think for Democracy and the Radical Violent Groups

2008-06-23T06:59:00.000-07:00

The joint ministerial decree managing the Ahmadiyah community does not solve the real problems in Indonesian multicultural society. Government was in hurry after the higher pressures of radical Muslim groups. I would like to observe some basic matters in Indonesian religious affairs, especially in the latest decade, ten years after the collapse of authoritarian regime New Order.

The first thing paying more serious attention is the rise of religious violent. The hatred, attacks, and killings by certain group to others are based on ideological religious background. Thousand killings in ethno-religious conflict regions of Maluku, Poso and Sampit reflected the reasons for the struggle of religion, ethnicity or group. Transnational radical networks involved in the deadly conflict, and influenced local community as part of new militant devoted followers, who later closed the conflicts by attacking civil people under the 'instruction' of Java based radical Muslim leader(s)in 2005. Two years later, the rest of Jihadists were arrested and confirmed the highest authority giving a license to kill. A good book published by Police in 2008 interestingly described the story. New types of schools and circles grow in post conflict regions, where local democracy grows to strengthen peace building attempted by civil society and government. The possible clash is possible to occur. On early June 2008, clashes between villages in Maluku were secured effectively by Ambon police. The rise of democracy and the stronger confidence of security preserve the peace. The phenomenon in outer Java is different from that of Java based radical groups.

The returnee of conflicts have produced troubles in Java. Maluku and Poso veterans train local young militias. They are now stronger and more skillful. In the protest and riots managed by Muslim community forum (FUI), the veterans involved and played important role as commander of religious learning community (Majelis Taklim), comprised of women and men. The ordinary people, who are actually good learners, asked to join the protest for the interest of radical leaders. This is the problem of government, which feel difficult to control and manage the potential violent community. The ambivalence of democracy, good governance and legal enforcement open broader opportunities of more violence under the name of faith.

Symposium: Indonesian Jihad

2008-06-22T20:19:00.000-07:00

By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, January 02, 2006

Militant Islam is gaining ground in Indonesia, the world’s most populous mostly Muslim nation. This development is of crisis proportions, since Indonesia plays a crucial role in guaranteeing security in Asia. This year’s second Bali terror attack was only the symbol of Islamism’s skyrocketing war on the country. Indeed, jihadists are intensely concentrating on annihilating any non-Muslim presence in Indonesia. The Ulema Council, the highest Islamic authority, has issued a fatwa condemning religious diversity. Christian churches have been closed and a law has been passed discriminating against non-Muslim schools. Three Christian girls were beheaded earlier this year.

The growing Jihad in Indonesia is directly connected to Islamist terror in the Philippines and Thailand, forming a deadly terror network in the Far East. The leadership of the Indonesian jihadist group Jemaah Islamiyah is terrifyingly clear in its intent, proudly bearing the motto: “Death in the way of Allah is our highest aspiration.”

In light of these dire circumstances, we ask the questions: How stable is Indonesia? What is the real dimension of Islamism there? What will happen if Indonesia falls? How would it impact Australia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and even China?

To discuss these and other questions with us today, Frontpage has assembled a distinguished panel. Our guests today are:

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, the author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. He is head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore;

Badrus Sholeh, the head of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta;

Andrew Cochran, the Founder & Editor of The Counterterrorism Blog. He is Vice President of GAGE, a business consulting and government affairs firm headquartered in Washington, DC. and advises clients on terrorism and homeland security, corporate governance, and appropriations issues; and

Walid Phares, a Professor of Middle East Studies and Senior Fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. He is the author of the new book Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America.

FP: Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Badrus Sholeh, Andy Cochran and Walid Phares, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.

Andrew Cochran, let me begin with you. I think a good place to start is with the recent second strike against Bali. What was its significance? And what does it say about the state of jihad in Indonesia?

Cochran: The significance of the second Bali bombings is that (a) Jemaah Islamiyah is alive and capable, and (b) the Indonesian government's refusal to recognize the dangers of Islamic extremism and to outlaw JI has come back to bite them.

We have yet another lesson that a government that intentionally blinds itself to the excesses of the worst strains of Islam, and fails to protect its citizenry from Islamist extremists who pursue terrorism.

In September 2004, the newly elected president continued the policies of his predecessors and announced that he would ban JI only after he had proof that the organization exists, since it "is not a formal organization with card-carrying members." And the former foreign minister of Australia pronounced Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) virtually dead and gone during the very week of the second bombings.

Meanwhile, Islamist parties of one kind or another have gained in recent parliamentary elections, led by PKS, which has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and is committed to sharia and to imposing Islamic law. The spiritual leader of PKS, Hidayat Nur Wahid, is now the speaker of the upper house of the parliament. This senior official in the Indonesian government had the gall to blame the second bombings on "interstate competition in the tourism industry," in effect a sanction of murder.

The damage to JI since the first Bali bombings should not have been assumed to have relieved the dangers from either JI or other Islamist extremist groups. Counterterrorism Blog contributor Zachary Abuza, who never accepted the hypothesis that JI had melted away, listed eight reasons why JI is still alive in a post on October 12.

Other Islamists, such as FPI, have engaged in aggressive recruiting and overt anti-Christian activities, such as the forced closing of churches. As long as the current government refuses to outlaw JI, and as long as the speaker of one of the elected houses of parliament leads the obfuscation of Islam and of terrorist attacks, the broader cause of jihad is also alive and well.

FP: Thank you Mr. Cochran. Mr. Sholeh?

Sholeh: Is there any positive fallout from the recent Indonesian elections of 2004 and 2005? Indonesia has actually turned into the most democratic Muslim nation in the world. The elections of 2004 and 2005 proved it, with participation of more than 80 percent of potential voters. This is something positive. However, after the collapse of New Order and the weakening of Indonesian Armed Forces, some Muslim militias expressed their identity within what they call a 'secular state'. The Afghan war created regional militant and Islamist group of Jama'ah Islamiah, which founded 'a war project' in the two most conflicting regions of Maluku and Poso from 2000-2005, for breeding, recruitment, training and preparation before their bigger plan.

Stability became worse after the economic crisis and during Susilo Bambang Yudoyono government’s unproductive policy of raising fuel price. Civil society including Islamic organizations supported the radical groups like Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and KPPSI of South Sulawesi gained stronger position. The key answer is the security forces' role and regional cooperation to oppose the growth of the radical and terrorist groups.

Because of the ambivalence of government, Jama'ah Islamiah has greater capability to run bigger attacks with their new approaches on every level of operation. Security forces have found that some radical groups like Laskar Mujahidin, KOMPAK Solo and Laskar Jundullah have played a role in bringing Jama'ah Islamiah influence in local regions of Maluku and Poso to fight against infidels (Christians) for more than three years. Government with anti-terror laws can ban these groups.

However, what Mr. Cochran calls the rise of political Islam under the leadership of PKS push nationalist politicians such as Susilo Bambang Yudoyono and more over Yusuf Kalla of Golkar to preserve their relation with Muslim constituents, who do not understand how those radical organization played a role on terrorism in cooperation with Jama'ah Islamiah. In Maluku and Poso, Muslim politicians who attempted to be neutral and oppose Islamist groups lost their positions in Parliament in the district elections of 2005.

I have been doing fieldwork in these two regions and have met local Muslims influenced by these radical groups. Some of the local elite have been involved with Jama'ah Islamiah, especially the ones from Laskar Mujahidin and KOMPAK networks. It is easy for Jama'ah Islamiah to attack tourism areas like Bali, and west embassies in Jakarta and other diplomatic buildings in Surabaya. They have had enough new and fresh Syahid (martyrs). Police say there are about 30 new syahid ready to blow themselves up with a new approach, many more than they had previously. A former Darul Islam activist says there are more than 500 new volunteers for syahid are ready. If Bali Bomb II has a better attack and strategy than Bali Bomb I, in which Indonesian police could not identify the terrorists more clearly and quickly, how about the next attack?

Gunaratna: To combat terrorism in Indonesia, we need to think strategically and ask Indonesians to think strategically. The political media and public attention is still fixated on Bali II. As usual, a brilliant after the event investigation will lead to a few arrests and a trial, but it will not change the strategic picture in Indonesia and the Southern Philippines. Making a difference in the East Asian environment now that is changing in favor of Islamic militancy does not rest with law enforcement but with action-oriented visionary leadership.

As long as jihadism is not proactively contained, the radical Islamic schools [madaris] in Indonesia are not reformed, and the training camps in the Philippines not shut down, the threat of terrorism will persist. In the post Bali II environment, the vulnerability of East Asia to terrorism will increase due to four reasons:

First, a highly effective and a contagious tactic, suicide terrorism, having entered the region, will stay with us for a long time. Unless ideologically and operationally contained, the suicide threat will spread from Indonesia to its immediate neighbors and beyond.

Second, 47 threat groups in different stages of development now operate in the region. By aggressively exploiting the democratic space created after 1998 and the constant images of the suffering Muslims in Iraq, the Indonesian Jihadi movement is gathering in strength, size and influence.

Third, the relationship between a decentralized Al Qaeda and both Indonesian and Philippine jihad groups are continuing. From outside the region, finance (primarily from Saudi Arabian financiers of jihad), trainers and technology are continuing to flow into the region. Although many Arab jihadists have been arrested in the region, the linkage between JI and Al Qaeda is robust.

Fourth, Iraq is having a profound impact on the radicalized and the politicized Muslims. By exploiting the anger and the suffering of the Muslims, including that of moderate Muslims, existing terrorist and the extremist groups are growing and new groups are emerging. A potential strategic defeat for America in Iraq in the coming years is likely to embolden the Asian terrorist and extremist groups even further.

Unless the ideologues, operatives, financiers, and supporters of jihad are interlocked and challenged ideologically, tactically, financially, and politically, the threat of terrorism and extremism will escalate in East Asia. What is the real threat to East Asia from terrorism? Will terrorism grow in Southeast Asia and eventually spread to Northeast Asia affecting Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo? Future Threat reduction is dependent on three initiatives:

First, operationally to dismantle the networks by targeting individual terrorists and their assets. Counter terrorism legislation is gravely needed to empower the police to use direction action to preventively dismantle the terrorist propaganda, recruitment, fund raising, procurement and other support activity

Second, ideologically for the Indonesian political leaders to build a norm and an ethic in society against politico-religiously inspired and instigated violence.

Third, to change the reality on the ground by negotiating to resolve protracted ethnic and religious conflicts. In the region, conflict zones such as Mindanao, Maluku and Poso produced suffering, displacement, refugee flows, formation of extremist ideologies, and production of extremists and terrorists.

Phares: I agree with my colleagues on their description of Jihadism in Indonesia and its projection in the near future. I also value the analysis of the importance of local politics on the growth of Islamism and penetration by the international and national groups of local Islamist networks.

Let me take the route from inside al Qaida's mind into what would be their strategy in Indonesia, or actually for Indonesia and the region. While I agree that events in Iraq and elsewhere, "increase" the level of mobilization among potential recruits and "encourage" pre- existing entities, we all know that Jihadism is not an emanation of sudden developments.

We all know that the process to become a Jihadist, is long and tenuous. It needs a Salafi-Wahabi environment to be produced. The question in Indonesia is this: Who is producing the "ideological culture" out of which Jama'ah Islamiah came from? What are the structural webs that produced Laskar Mujahidin (or Laskar e Jihad), or Laskar Jundullah or even the Sulawesi-based Mujahedeen KOMPAK?

These questions are crucial to answer for it would determine the strategy to counter, contain and reverse Jihadism in the largest Muslim country in the world. For if the entire strategy is either security-based (arrests, disruption and justice action) or politically based (absorption, engagement and cooption) it would fail on the long run. Islamists, and particularly Jihadists are very sophisticated and have demonstrated their ability to outmanoeuvre and outsmart the actions by politicians or generals.

If pressed by the central Government, they can revert to inflaming Maluku and Poso with ethno-religious strife. They can play on the local politics of Mindanao, etc. The pyramid of Jihadism starting with al Qaida internationally, JI nationally and the other regional groups has a panoply of tools to escape Governmental action, which is late, heavy and based on a complex level of political consensus.

The main problem however is the capability of the Jihadist conglomerate to trigger past experiences and focus on current internal wounds. Ben Laden was fast enough two years ago to denounce the United Nations "infidel" aggression in East Timor. This accusation, not understood by the international community, is a message to Indonesia's general nationalist and Muslim public, carried by the Islamists: No more East Timors.

Hence, the Jihadi "Laskars" around the archipelago are projecting themselves as the "protectors" of the territorial unity of "Muslim Indonesia." Hence their action against non-Muslims, including in Poso, the Celebes, etc is projected as "in the interest of the nation." They are trying to emulate Hassan Turabi's strategy in Sudan: the defense of Islam's lands.

From that angle, when al Qaida orders strikes against Western-symbols in the country, for instance Bali I and II, it knows it is playing the Jihadist versus Kafir (infidel) equation. The subcontractors of terror, JI for example are projecting themselves as the sword of the Islamist movement in Indonesia with a legitimate blessing from the international command. The response of the Indonesian state is therefore limited in its scope: an all out war by any Government against the Jihadists (who are claiming the defense of Indonesia's Islamic idencity) is very difficult. At best it is limited. Add to it the uncertainty as to the Salafi influence inside the armed forces. As in Pakistan, no one really knows its extent. It was reported that Laskar Jihad has had significant alliances within the armed forces in its holy wars against the "infidels" at the end of the 1990s. The next question is what could be done?

The answer to that question begins with this: who in Indonesia wants to confront Jihadism's real roots: the Islamist Salafi ideology? Is there a sufficient political coalition across the land which would back an all out campaign? A large group of legislators, members of the cabinet, intellectuals, journalists, officers and political parties that can articulate an anti-Jihadist agenda? Is there a plan regarding the alternatives to the madrassas? Is there enough media ready to engage? So far, these questions need to be answered by the Indonesian experts so that a geopolitical design is put together.

Cochran: I appreciate the wise observations here that there must be a greater appreciation of the ties between the local elites and the international jihadists, and a greater effort to supplant those ties with "a norm and an ethic in society against politico-religiously inspired and instigated violence" (quoting Dr. Gunaratna). The long-term challenge in Indonesia, as it is wherever the jihadists appear, is to attract local populations to a non-violent and tolerant Islamic cultural which promises personal fulfillment. The jihadists' social activism must be matched and exceeded by moderate Islamic clerics, businessmen, and government.

One of the most disappointing aspects of the current worldwide conflict is that the decades of experience of Muslims in the U.S., which has been marked by assimilation and peaceful relations with non-Muslims, is never reported overseas. The very culture that my colleagues suggest as necessary in Islamic countries already exists here - there are no pillaged mosques, no Muslims assaulted in the streets for their faith, and no flood of legal cases for discrimination against Muslims in hiring or in business.

Sholeh: I agree with Dr. Rohan that there is a close association among international, national and local issues and movements related to terrorism. I would like to broaden the issues and provide my argument from Indonesian experience and the Indonesian perspective.

Indonesian Muslims believe the U.S. and its allies have a double-standard concerning Palestine-Israel policies and the failure of the Iraq war and other policies, which Muslims argue is against their interests. This is an easy reason for radical and terrorist groups to recruit new members under such international issues. Imam Samudra (2004), one of the Bali I bombers, states that US allies' failed policies against Middle Eastern Muslims inspired his group to fight against infidels in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

His book, entitled 'Aku Melawan Teroris! [I am against Terrorism] has become a popular text for recruitment. I also agree that Indonesian government and neighbors have to restrain the growth of radical Islamic movements. However, some of them were founded under support of Indonesian elite, such as the Laskar Jihad and Islamic Defenders Front foundations, which claim to strengthen Indonesian government and security to fight against separatism.

They found volunteers to bring Jihad to Maluku and Poso from 1999 to 2002. Their members are even still active on the ground without any significant security from Indonesian Police and TNI. Some current researches of ICG and others argue that they are less dangerous compared to Laskar Mujahidin and Jama'ah Islamiah. The latest two groups certainly continue their underground Jihad, although some Jihadists have been arrested after Bali Bombing II. Dr. Azhari (killed in Malang, East Java November 2005) has taught young members of JI to produce bombs. It is strengthened by the on going movements and recruitments of Nurdin M. Top. The young JI elite members have extensive terror training in Mindanao, Southern Philippines, Poso and Maluku.

Previously they became members of Muslim organizations: MMI, KPPSI, Brigades of PII and NII. They grow from central and local regions of Indonesia, without any government policy to close such a breeding organization. These organizations also instituted a number of Islamic schools and Pesantrens. They will be stronger if governments do not take a significant policy to reform such organizations and schools.

Certainly, the majority of Muslim organizations and schools are moderate and against terrorism. However, they need a strong policy from Indonesian and international governments to fight against radical groups.

FP: I am not sure what “failure” you are referring to in terms of the Iraq war. We liberated a country from a fascist dictator and are now building democracy in a region marked by authoritarianism and brutality. We have also taken the fight to the terrorists in a war that they have declared on us. But this is another debate.

Dr. Gunaratna go ahead.

Gunaratna: Until I moved to Southeast Asia from Europe in 2002, I was under the impression that the most important quality needed to fight terrorism is intelligence. Today, I am convinced that even with good intelligence we will fail unless we have political leadership. In the fight against terrorism, the most important quality is leadership - in another words, political will and political capital.

With visionary leadership, you can anticipate threats and defeat them before they affect you. With a goal oriented leadership you can defeat any terrorist or extremist movement. This is what is gravely lacking in Southeast Asia.

FP: So what kind of leadership exactly do we need in Southeast Asia, Dr. Phares?

Phares: When it come to the analysis of Indonesian micro politics, I'd defer of course to the political scientists, journalists and analysts with advanced expertise in the political history of the country. But from the perspective of comparative politics and more precisely the angle of international Jihadism, here are some points:
a) One has to examine how the Jihadists (call them Islamists if you wish) got to the point of vast networks and high influence. How come they have been able to produce leadership that can sustain several suppressive waves and maintain a trend of penetration of the Indonesian layers of power and culture?
If we understand this road, we can begin to understand the possible other alternatives. Why is it that the Islamists have produced their own "leaders" while the national leaders and politicians of Indonesia, although good Muslims, aren't viewed by the experts as visionaries and goal oriented? I may not have all the answers, but at least I would indicate the analytical path we should be exploring.
b) If we agree that at the end of the day, in Indonesia and around the Muslim world, the networks of madrassas are the chief producer of militants, what can be done to address that issue? Can politicians touch the madrassas without severe consequences? Can reform come from governing bodies, from politicians or courts? Answering this question is crucial. It would show us the real equation not just in Indonesia, but also in the region as a whole.
c) And if I can take the issue to a wider scope, learning from the Indonesian crisis, I'd ask: can Wahabism be reversed? Can Salafism be reversed? And how?

I can fully understand my colleagues when they raise the objections made by many in Indonesia, but also in Bengladesh, Malaysia and elsewhere that "the US is seen as a supporter of Israel, therefore we cannot trust Washington." This is an argument produced by the Islamists from the Middle East who wish to see it spreading around the Muslim world. It is the classical argument that allowed the Islamists to dodge their responsibilities in answering harder questions about the future they intend to bring.

Several times, I went on al Jazeera and challenged my interlocutors. I asked them openly: what is the alternative, the system you wish establish on the Umma's lands? There were no significant answers. For the simple reason that they hide behind the anti-American paradigm, but can't reveal theirs. What is needed is a current of thought that would engage the Jihadis openly, and drive them to debate their own ideas and views.

Indonesia could become an important testing ground for this challenge.

Sholeh: I will respond some issues and questions raised by Phares and Gunaratna on how the visionary leadership may overcome radicalism and terrorism, how the Jihadist could be involved in national parties or civil organizations, what the impact of for peace building, the process of democracy and how it will be pivotal that schools and other prospective institutions discontinue their violence-oriented organizations.

The participation of the Jihadist or Islamist community in public and political sectors is crucial to reducing radicalism and terrorism. Peter Wallensteen (2004: 146) calls this as a power sharing arrangement, which puts the existing leaders securely in the political process. They may oppose working with government but they may engage in future building for their community. Democracy is the best choice, and it is appealing to them to have their voices represented in the national parties. Former local Mujahidin and Jihad commanders in Maluku and Poso of Indonesia have become involved in Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Development United Party (PPP) or have been appointed as community/ public leaders (after conflicts of 1999-2002) in 2004 direct elections.

This also happens in Afghan, where former combat commanders are accommodated by new government under democratic philosophy. This may answer Phares' first question on how we can transform Islamist leaders under democratic government. Under civil or political organizations, government can steer their intelligence agents into such groups to manage and control the vision and orientation of the leadership. They have strengthened themselves into international network of Islamic parties and organizations: PAS of Malaysia, Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and Salafist organizations in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Their cooperation is alright unless they support violent activities, terrorism or other crimes. Dr. Gunaratna's reflection of visionary leadership will enhance the broader participation of multicultural society in Southeast Asia context.

The next step is continuing to promote peace within religious communities. To assure them that terrorism and violence (read: attacks, suicide bombs and killings) are crimes. My interviews with former Mujahidin commanders in Maluku and Poso refer to how they finally realized that their actions were against Islamic principles. The Indonesian government has just promoted the true meaning of Jihad among Muslims. Similarly, Muslim scholars of Al Azhar University have made strong authoritative declarations against bin Laden's initiatives: 'Islam provides clear rules and ethical norms that forbid the killing of non-combatants, as well as women, children, and the elderly' (Esposito, 2002: 158). Most Muslim Ulama declare that suicide bombs are against the principles of Islam.

To bring peace, policy should focus on multi-faith and multicultural dialogues and encourage Islamic civil society organizations and schools to open their perspectives on general interest issues like reducing poverty and developing education (as education is power). It has been more than a hundred years since Pesantren integrated the local cultures of Indonesia. This experience is identical in Southern Thailand and Malaysia.

Only a limited number, approximately less than 1 percent of all schools, teach radical and militant interpretations of Islam. Among them are Pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki, Solo, Central Java and Al Irsyad of Central Java. They grew significantly after the return of Afghan veterans. The Afghan war and participation of Jihadist groups in the war allowed their veterans to develop new Pesantren (Islamic schools/ madrasas) within their home countries. It is challenging not only for government but also the dominant and mainstream Islamic civil society organizations to reduce the negative impact of the radical Jihadist groups.

Salafism teaching is still strange among most Muslims even in conflicting regions like Maluku and Poso, moreover in peaceful regions of Java and Sumatra. In Maluku, local Muslims opposed the teaching and tradition of Salafism among Laskar Jihad members. Mainstream CSOs are important instruments for us to stop the growth of radicalism and certainly terrorism. Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah - argued as having at least 70 and 40 millions members each - are among those committed to promote peace and denounce any kind of radicalism and violence.

Gunaratna: The trends in Indonesia are not very different to global trends. Although in Indonesia there is an acute absence of a visionary leadership particularly counter terrorist leadership, this is a global problem. Unless we plan for the long term we will suffer and perhaps fail in some parts of the world. It is inevitable that in Palestine and Egypt, the Jihadists and the Islamists will come to power.

We need to build greater support worldwide to fight terrorism and extremism. At a global level, fighting terrorism and extremism is 50% of the battle. The remaining 50% must focus on educating ones own staff particularly leaders. We must develop specialist in-house courses for staff particularly leaders so that governments will do the right thing and not overreact like the US invasion of Iraq.

Finally, we need to work in partnership as we are facing a global threat that is growing. We need to draw the Europeans and other nations whose commitment is weak to fight terrorism and extremism to be partners. We also need the rich nations of the global north to work closely with poor nations of the global south and share the burden of counter terrorism.

FP: It boggles my mind how we just saw more successful elections in Iraq and instead of pointing out what a great thing Bush did by bringing democracy to that country and that part of the world, which is a great blow to our Jihadist enemies, the only comment some individuals can make about Iraq is how the U.S. liberation of the nation is an “overreaction.”

In any case, Dr. Phares, last word goes to you.

Phares: All depends on how you see the big picture. To those among us who believe that time was on the side of the international society, including after the collapse of the Taliban, Iraq's invasion is an "overreaction." But to those whose analysis concluded, and I am one of them, that Global Jihadism was at the edge of rolling over in the Muslim world and wreck havoc in the West, the regime change in Iraq -or any alternative US reaction- was late, very late.

If you look at the infrastructure of the Jihadists, Salafists and Khomeinists since the early 1990s, you'd realize that their combined networks, regimes, penetrations, were thrusting forward. In my book, Future Jihad, I make the case that both 9/11 and the 2 US reactions, have readjusted the balance, but not yet turned the tide.

As far as containing and absorbing the Jihadists of Indonesia, I'd defer to the experts on micro Indonesian politics, but based on my own interviews of Muslim and Christian activists of the islands-nation, and on my Jihad-analysis, one must make a distinction between containment and reform.

There are many recipes for the so-called integration and cooptation of the Salafists and Jihadists in the political process. This was the theory of the 1990s in America (Esposito, Entelis, MESA, etc). However, evidence shows that while initiatives were developed to absorb the Jihadis, or even Islamists into the democratic process, it ended up having the Islamists (Salafists in Indonesia and Arabia and Khomeinists as in Lebanon) penetrating the system and slowly absorbing its energies.

In this conflict, the objective is the reformation of the Muslim world not the accommodation of the Jihadists. My take, both for Indonesia and the other cases (Iraq, Egypt, etc) is that international efforts should be focused certainly to fighting terrorism relentlessly, but in parallel, providing open support to the reformists. Only then can we win the long term war for the soul of the Islamic world.

FP: Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Badrus Sholeh, Andy Cochran and Walid Phares, thank you for joining Frontpage Symposium.

Jamie Glazov is Frontpage Magazine's managing editor. He holds a Ph.D. in History with a specialty in U.S. and Canadian foreign policy. He edited and wrote the introduction to David Horowitz’s Left Illusions. He is also the co-editor (with David Horowitz) of The Hate America Left and the author of Canadian Policy Toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (McGill-Queens University Press, 2002) and 15 Tips on How to be a Good Leftist. To see his previous symposiums, interviews and articles Click Here. Email him at jglazov@rogers.com.

2008-06-22T00:22:00.000-07:00

Muslim insurgents kill 4 in attack on train in restive southern Thailand: police

The Associated Press , Bangkok | Sun, 06/22/2008 9:46 AM | World

Suspected Muslim insurgents shot dead four people aboard a train as it traveled through southern Thailand, police said.

Ten gunmen entered the driver's cabin as the train approached a station in Yala province on Saturday night, then shot and killed three civilian employees and a policeman, said police Lt. Noraset Suksri.

The attackers fled when the train stopped after the shooting, the police officer said.

Yala is one of three southernmost provinces beset by a separatist insurgency in which more than 3,000 people have been killed since early 2004.

Muslims in the three provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat - the majority in Buddhist Thailand's far south - accuse the central government of discrimination, especially in jobs and education. (*) (The Jakarta Post,Sunday, June 22, 2008 2:12 PM

The riots will go on and Possible Impact

2008-06-20T19:40:00.001-07:00

The riots organized by radical Muslim groups in Jakarta will continue. After the clash between Islamic Defenders Fighters and the nationalist alliance of AKKBB on the 1st June, Muslim Community Forum (FUI) organized bigger protest on Wednesday, 18 June 2008 in National Monument. They called in the meeting among FUI and Habaib Forum for the proposal of closing Ahmadiyah and the release of FPI commander Habib Rizieq. It was attended by around 200.000 Muslims. They come from some radical organizations and foundations. Among them are Misi Islam, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Front Betawi Rempug (FBR), Gerakan Pemuda Islam, Majelis Taklims, PPP party, Crescent Star Party, Persatuan Islam. Some leading figures came to give a talk. They were Ustaz Muzakkir from Solo, Muhammad Al Khattat (HTI), Abdulrasyid Abdullah Syafii (As Syafiiyah Foundation), KH. Abdul Hamid Baidlowi, the head of Pesantren Al Wahdah Lasem, Rembang, and Dangdut singer Roma Irama. Twenty percent of them are women Muslims from Islamic Preaching Foundations in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, Bekasi and Depok, especially the religious forums managed by Habaib. In the future protests, they claimed to invite more leaders to come. Merdeka Barat streets were full of motorcycles, minibuses and cars used by the protesters. They continued the protest to Jakarta Metro Police (Polda Metro) in Sudirman Street. Jakarta streets on Wednesday, 18 June from 9 am to 3 pm were jam, people's transportations were disturbed. The protests and riots will continue, and how is the impact for Jakarta and Indonesia in the long term? Indonesia as popularly called moderate Muslim region will change more and more into radical region. The image of multicultural society will decrease and the future of economic crisis recovery is under threat. Who may save Indonesian from more crisis?

The Argument of FPI Lawyers

2008-06-17T01:35:00.000-07:00

Ari Yusuf Amir, the lawyer of Habib Rizieq argues that there was no proof that his client involved as he was not on the spot when that attack occurred in Monas on 1st June 2008. Amir refused the charge of his client based on 156 KUHP (Indonesian criminal law) about attack and destroy, 160 KUHP about instigating statement, 221 KUHP about hiding the criminals, 170 KUHP about group attack, and 351 KUHP are stated by Amir as exaggerating. See the following news by a Muslim internet media. The judicial review of the charge will continue this week. FPI will attempt hardly to invite their followers all over Indonesia to join a pressure against government for the release of Habib Rizieq, and continue for a fighting against Ahmadiyah.

Penangkapan dan Penahanan Habib Rizieq Tidak Sah

Eramuslim.com,Senin, 16 Jun 08 17:19 WIB
Penangkapan dan penahanan Ketua Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Habib Rizieq Shihab yang dilakukan pihak kepolisian terkait insiden Monas 1 Juni lalu dianggap tidak sesuai dengan aturan hukum yang berlaku. Karena itu, Kuasa Hukum Habib Rizieq Ary Yusuf Amir meminta agar kliennya segera dibebaskan

Hal ini diungkapkan Kuasa Hukum Habib Rizieq Shihab, Ary Yusuf Amir dalam pembacaan permohonan praperadilan FPI terhadap Kapolri Jenderal Sutanto dan Kapolda Metro Jaya Inspektur Jenderal Adang Firman atas penangkapan dan penahanan Habib Rizieq di Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan, Senin (16/6).

"Karena menurut KUHP, penangkapan harus ditunjukkan dengan surat penangkapan dan alasan penangkapan itu, " ungkapnya.

Selain itu, dia juga mengungkapkan, penahanan terhadap kliennya tersebut tidak didasari atas bukti-bukti awal penahanan. Menurutnya, dalam insiden yang melibatkan anggota FPI dengan AKKBB itu, Habib Rizieq tidak berada di lokasi saat kejadian berlangsung.

Ia menegaskan, penggunaan pasal-pasal yang disangkakan kepada Habib Rizieq seperti pasal 156 KUHP tentang penyerangan dan pengursakan, pasal 160 KUHP tentang pernyataan yang menghasut, pasal 221 KUHP tentang menyembunyikan pelaku tindak pidana, pasal 170 KUHP tentang pengeroyokan serta pasal 351 KUHP tentang penganiayaan dianggap sebagai langkah mengada-ada dari pihak kepolisian untuk menahannya.

"Pasal itu mengada-ada, kenapa Habib dikenakan pasal 351 dan 170, karena dua pasal ini yang membuat dia ditahan, karena ancaman hukumannya lebih dari dua tahun, " tanyanya.

Oleh karena itu, dia meminta agar Rizieq dibebaskan dari segala tuntutan yang disangkakan kepadanya. Selain itu, dia meminta majelis hakim memutuskan penangkapan dan penahanan itu tidak sah. Mendengarkan tuntutan pemohonan pra peradilan tersebut. Hakim dalam sidang ini menyatakan sidangkan akan dilanjutkan besok Selasa (17/6), dengan agenda mendengarkan pembela dari Polda Metro Jaya. (novel)
Source:
http://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nas/8616124157-penangkapan-dan
-penahanan-habib-rizieq-tidak-sah.htm?prev, accessed on 17 June 2008.

South East Asia: Democracy, Multiculturalism and Ethnicities

2008-06-16T23:28:00.000-07:00

Southeast Asian region is one of the diverse regions on the World. It has varieties of religions, ethnic groups and political-economy. Asean Focus Group reported that: Looking at the recent evolution of Southeast Asia perhaps the most significant thing has been the change that has occurred since the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. Until relatively recently the centrally planned economy model had much attraction for many developing countries and there was up to the beginning of the eighties quite widespread aversion to capitalism and to the liberal market model as exemplified by the Western industrialised countries.

FPI Judicial Review

2008-06-16T11:03:00.000-07:00

Monday, 16 June 2008 about two thousand Islamic Defenders Front members from Jakarta and Banten attended the first judicial review of the legal reasons for Habib Rizieq charged of protecting the FPI group members after attacking the AKKBB activists in Monas Jakarta on 1st June 2008. It was in South Jakarta State Court guarded by hundreds polices. Other groups also joined FPI's protest. They were the young faction of United Development Party (PPP) and FBR. They planned for bigger protest, claimed millions radical Muslims will come to National Monument (Monas) for asking government releasing their commander Habib Rizieq on Wednesday, 18 June 2008. The issues of riots raised by Muslim Community Forum (FUI), the umbrella of radical Muslims, are also the total closing of Ahmadiyah group, the rising of fuel prices and the failure of SBY-JK government policy. They are disappointed of the SKB Three Ministers, which they interpret it allowing Ahmadiyah people to continue their religious tradition. See the decree of SKB. I think some elements of 'opposition' green parties will continue to support the riots for decreasing the popularity of government before 2009 elections. Read also the following news.

Kompas, Senin, 16 Juni 2008 | 22:20 WIB
Habib Rizieq Minta Dibebaskan

JAKARTA, SENIN - Sidang perdana gugatan praperadilan yang diajukan Ketua Front Pembela Islam (FPI) Habieb Rizieq Shihab terhadap Polda Metro Jaya mulai digelar. Habib Rizieq menganggap, penangkapan dan penahanannya tidak sah. Oleh karena itu, ia meminta agar dibebaskan dari penahanan

Kuasa hukum Habib Rizieq yakni Ari Yusuf Amir mengatakan, kliennya bersikap kooperatif saat ratusan polisi dari Polda Metro Jaya melakukan penangkapan terhadap anggota FPI pada tanggal 4 Juni lalu.

"Kami menilai penangkapan tidak sah. Setelah sampai di Polda (Metro Jaya) klien kami turut diperiksa, dan langsung ditahan. Oleh karena itu, kami minta hakim membatalkan penangkapan dan penahanan ini," ungkap Ari di Pengadilan Negeri (PN) Jakarta Selatan, Senin (16/6).

Ari Yusuf mengatakan, sesampai di Polda dikatakan bahwa kliennya kemungkinan tidak ditahan. Pasalnya, sangkaan menyembunyikan pelaku tindak kejahatan hanya diancam hukuman sembilan bulan penjara, atau kurang dari lima tahun sehingga tidak perlu ditahan.

Namun yang terjadi, Habib Rizieq pada hari berikutnya dikenakan tambahan pasal yakni melakukan kekerasan terhadap orang lain, melakukan tindakan kekerasan terhadap orang lain (pasal 170 KUHP) dan pasal penganiyaan (pasal 351 KUHP).

"Bagaimana mungkin, orang yang tidak ada di tempat (Monas), melakukan penganiayaan," ungkap Ari berapi-api di depang sidang tanpa membaca surat permohonan yang diajukannya.

Melihat sikap Ari yang seperti itu, hakim tunggal Hari Sasongko kemudian memotong permohonannya. "Cukup, cukup, kalau Anda seperti itu apa bedanya dengan pidato. Jangan seperti berpidato, bacakan saja permohonannya," kata Hari.

Selama persidangan, massa Forum Umat Islam (FUI) memenuhi ruang persidangan dan dan seluruh penjuru pengadilan. Ratusan polisi dikerahkan untuk mengamankan jalannya persidangan.

Ditemui usai persidangan, salah satu kuasa hukum Polda Metro Jaya, AKBP Sjamsu Rizal enggan mengomentari gugatan tersebut. "Saya tidak bisa kasih komentar, besok saja ya," ujarnya.

Hari Selasa (17/6) besok persidangan akan dilanjutkan dengan agenda pembacaan tanggapan termohon atas gugatan Habib Rizieq. (Persda Network/yulis)
Sumber:
http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/06/16/22201957/habib.rizieq.minta.dibebaskan, diakses 16 Juni 2008.

2008-06-16T10:57:00.000-07:00

The Straits Times, June 16, 2008
Philippine kidnappers set Tuesday deadline for hostage release
'We don't know what they (the abductors) are up to and what they are asking from the family of Drilon, but they gave me an ultimatum until Tuesday to resolve this problem,' said mayor of Indanan Isnaji Alvarez.

JOLO (Philippines) - MUSLIM extremists who abducted a broadcaster and her crew in the Philippines have set a deadline of Tuesday for delivery of a million-dollar ransom, a negotiator said on Monday.

The ultimatum came after troops shelled a forested area on the southern island of Jolo where the extremists are holding the three, injuring a woman living in the area, officials said.

Troops moved on Sunday into the area near the town of Indanan to put pressure on Abu Sayyaf extremists who snatched the group on June 8.

'One woman was rushed here at the hospital because of shrapnel wounds she got from the shelling,' a staff member at Sulu Provincial Hospital said.

ABS-CBN television journalist Ces Drilon, her cameramen Jimmy Encarnacion and Angelo Valderama, and university professor Octavio Dinampo were heading to a secret meeting with a senior Abu Sayyaf leader when they were seized.

The abductors freed Valderama on June 12 after a ransom of 100,000 pesos (S$3,100) was paid.

They have since made contact with Ms Drilon's family and given them until Tuesday to come up with a ransom, thought to be about US$1.12 million (S$1.54 million), for her safe release, negotiator Isnaji Alvarez said.

He said he had asked the military to stop shelling so negotiations could continue.

'We don't know what they (the abductors) are up to and what they are asking from the family of Drilon, but they gave me an ultimatum until Tuesday to resolve this problem,' said Mr Alvarez, who is also mayor of Indanan.

'The kidnappers wanted the family of Drilon to comply with their agreement,' he said without elaborating.

'I need to know what the family of Drilon promised to the kidnappers. All negotiations should pass through me,' he added.

A deadline for the other two hostages was unclear.

'It seems only Drilon's family is interested in talking to the kidnappers,' Mr Alvarez said. Her employers have stressed the station will not pay ransom.

Mr Alvarez said the military shelling was outside the area where the hostages are thought to be kept, but 'we asked for the operations to be called off so the kidnappers will not do anything drastic.'

Ms Drilon, 46, had gone to Jolo to interview Radulan Sahiron, one of the surviving Abu Sayyaf leaders who mounted a string of abductions of western tourists in the south in 2000 and 2001, raising millions of dollars in ransom.

Many of the other leaders have been killed or arrested in military operations assisted by US Special Forces military advisers who are temporarily based in Jolo and nearby islands.

President Gloria Arroyo has ordered police and troops get back all of the hostages alive, and military reinforcements arrived here on Sunday. -- AFP
Source:
http://www.straitstimes.com/Latest%2BNews/S-E%2BAsia/
STIStory_248443.html

Protest in Bangkok

2008-06-16T10:46:00.000-07:00

The Straits Times, June 16, 2008
Thousands protest at Thai Election Commission

Members of the so-called People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) marched past the capital's busy shopping district before demonstrating for two hours outside the EC offices, a senior Bangkok police officer said.

BANGKOK - ABOUT 4,000 anti-government protesters marched on Monday to Thailand's Election Commission (EC) to protest at what they claimed was a bias towards ousted premier Thaksin Shinawatra, police said.

Members of the so-called People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) marched past the capital's busy shopping district before demonstrating for two hours outside the EC offices, a senior Bangkok police officer said.

PAD leaders, whose protests in early 2006 preceded a coup later that year, claim the EC favoured the Thaksin-backed People Power Party (PPP) which won elections in December last year, marking a return to democracy in Thailand.

'The PAD thinks that the current political crisis was caused by some members of the EC who worked with bias to protect the Thaksin system,' the group said in a statement.

The PAD has since May 25 blocked off a key thoroughfare outside the United Nations headquarters in Bangkok's historic district, demanding PPP leader and Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej to resign.

Although the number of protesters has dwindled to several hundred, the political uncertainly has sent the Thai stock market falling in recent weeks and sparked rumours of another coup in the kingdom.

Mr Thaksin was overthrown in September 2006 by royalist generals who launched a number of corruption investigations into the ousted premier.

The EC investigated allegations of vote fraud after the December polls and disqualified a number of PPP's winning candidates, but Mr Samak still had enough seats to form a coalition government and take office. -- AFP
Read:http://www.straitstimes.com/Latest%2BNews/S-E%2BAsia/
STIStory_248487.html

Islamic Defenders Front and the Threat of Plurality

2008-06-14T18:33:00.000-07:00

Islamic Defenders Front was founded on 17 August 1998 by Al Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Hussein Shihab, KH Cecep Bustomi and KH Idrus Jamalulil in Pesantren Al Um Kampung Utan, Ciputat South Jakarta. FPI appointed the chairperson Al Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Hussein Shihab, popularly called Habib Riziq. Habib Riziq was born in Jakarta on 24 August 1965. He is the fifth son of Hussein Shihab and Sidah Alatas. Habib Riziq graduated from Islamic Law King of Saud University, Saudi Arabia (Kompas, 4 June 2008). Indonesian and the World concern on FPI after the attack of the militia members to the activists of AKKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan, the National Alliance for Religious and Faith Freedom) on 1st June 2008 in National Monument (Monas) Jakarta. FPI is a phenomenon of Islamic radicalism grows after the collapse of New Order. It seems a contradictory between the rise of democracy and freedom of expression and the legal forces to regulate violent groups, which have threatened the multicultural spirit and dignity of the nation. The huge numbers of FPI members attract Muslim politicians to cooperate with the militia group. FPI claims to have branches in most provinces and big cities all over Indonesia. Millions members with the same character attempt Islamic syari’ah implementation in Indonesia. In many cities of Java especially, it is common to see the operation or sweeping of FPI members to the places they accused as against Islamic syari’ah like café. In East Java, they forced people to close their shops during Friday prayer time to imitate the practice in Saudi Arabia. The chairman of the Development United Party (PPP) and the State Minister of Co-op and Small Medium Enterprises, Mr. Suryadharma Ali visited the head of FPI, Habib Riziq, who has been in prison since 3 June 2008 charged to protect FPI members and the commander Munarman the attackers of AKKBB activists. It is the way to attract Muslim voters before 2009 elections. Will other politicians concern their own group and party and do not care of the ruins of Indonesian unity and plurality?

Referensi Konflik di Asia Tenggara

2008-06-01T08:21:00.000-07:00

Buku ini menjelaskan konflik dan kekerasan di Asia Tenggara yang dilandasi dengan ideologi, agama dan politik.

This timely and significant book seeks to explain the deep-seated complexities of terrorism and insurgency in Southeast Asia. In the aftermath of 9/11, this region has been designated by the United States to be the ‘second front’ in the war on terrorism. Yet despite the emergence of this ‘new’ global terrorism, the authors argue that armed rebellion in Southeast Asia is a phenomenon that predates Al Qaeda and the global Jihadist movement and that much can be learned from the motivations behind it.

Written by a group of leading Western and emerging Southeast Asian scholars, this extensive volume demonstrates the difficulty and diversity of rebellion in Southeast Asia, and explores its intricate historical, political, social and economic roots. The book will serve as an excellent reference and educational text, providing an empirical and regional guide to the complex problem of insurgency in Southeast Asia. It will also contribute to a more educated understanding that could provide the basis for appropriate counter-terrorism strategies in this important part of the world.

Comprehensive and engaging, this volume will find widespread appeal amongst researchers, students and policymakers interested in terrorism, international relations and Asian studies and will also be an invaluable tool for studies into political violence and security.

Demokrasi, Konflik dan Rekonsiliasi di Indonesia

2008-06-01T06:33:00.000-07:00

Badrus Sholeh

Johan Galtung (1990) menyatakan bahwa salah satu mekanisme rekonsiliasi adalah pembagian kekuasaan (power sharing) antar faksi yang bertikai. Apabila dilakukan melalui pemilihan (vote) oleh para anggota faksi, maupun komunitas terkait maka terjadi proses demokrasi. Demikian pengalaman demokrasi di Indonesia pasca Orde Baru, 1999 dan 2004, pemilu telah mengantarkan konflik di Maluku, Poso, Sampit dan Aceh menuju perdamaian. Pada Pemilu pertama pasca Orde Baru, 1999, konflik baru berjalan sekitar enam bulan. Ketika masa Pemilu, sejak kampanye hingga pencoblosan, memang tidak terjadi bentrokan antar massa yang berarti.Tetapi tidak lebih dari sebulan setelah pencoblosan bentrokan terjadi, masjid dan gereja dibakar, massa yang menamakan diri mereka membela agama saling membunuh. Demokrasi tanpa ditopang dengan fondasi pemerintah yang kuat sangat rentan. Hasil demokrasi tidak memberi signifikan dalam upaya rekonsiliasi antar masyarakat. Tekanan internasional datang setelah setidaknya tujuh ribu manusia kehilangan nyawa, dan ratusan ribu kehilangan tempat tinggal. Pemerintah bergegas mengehentikan ’proyek’ ini. Periode kedua, 2004, Pemilu lebih bermakna. Perdamaian, stabilitas dan rekonsiliasi terjadi. Para pemimpin masing-masing kelompok menempati masing-masing singgasananya. Banyak komandan milisi lokal menjadi pemimpin partai, organisasi pemerintah atau lembaga pendidikan pemerintah. Demokrasi telah mengantarkan mereka untuk berbagi kekuasaan. Argumen Galtung tentang pembagian kekuasaan terlampaui dalam proses demokrasi, yang ditopang oleh negara dan masyarakat sipil yang kuat ini. Di Poso, hasil pemilihan kepala daerah pada 2005 mencerminkan pembagian kekuasaan Kristen (70 %) dan Muslim (30 %). Tetapi banyak milisi, khususnya dipihak Muslim, tidak mengakui hasil pembagian kekuasaan ini. Mereka menyatakan golput, acuh atas percaturan politik, bahkan dalam pandangan salafy haram hukumnya berdemokrasi karena demokrasi dari rakyat untuk rakyat, sementara dalam Islam terdapat sistem syura – dalam argumen mereka – dari rakyat untuk Tuhan (Abdurrahman, 2007).

Jacques Bertrand (2004) menilai bahwa akar konflik di Indonesia pasca Orde Baru terdiri dari beberapa sebab: (1) politik marjinalitas, kasus Kalimantan Barat, (2) politik agama, kasus Maluku, (3) politik identitas dan otonomi luas, kasus Aceh. Bertrand mengangggap ketiga akar konflik ini akan bisa diatasi dengan ide otonomi daerah yang dilaksanakan dengan pengawasan yang baik khususnya dalam penyelenggaraan pemerintah yang bersih (good and clean governance).

Marjinalitas etnis telah menyebabkan faksionalisasi komunitas dan rasa kebencian yang dalam terhadap etnis dominan pemerintah pusat. Pada Pemilu 1950an etnis lokal di Kalimantan membentuk partai politik, atau sekarang disebut partai lokal, Partatai Persatuan Dayak (PPD). Pada Pemilu 1955 suara di Kalimantan Barat cukup signifikan, 33.1 % , nomor dua setelah partai Masyumi, yang berbasis Muslim Melayu, 35.2 % (Feith, 1957, Bertrand, 2004: 53). Meskipun mendapat suara terbanyak kedua, dan menjadi etnis asli terbesar yang menyebar diseluruh Borneo, tetapi Pemerintah Sukarno tidak memberi tempat mereka untuk menjadi gubernur, yang sejak 1950-1957 seluruhnya Jawa. Marjinalisasi ini sempat menurun ketika Sukarno melarang Masyumi sebagai partai dalam periode Demokrasi Terpimpin. Identitas Dayak terbentuk melalui institusi politik. Sejak 1957-hingga akhir 1960an, etnis lokal dayak menguasai politik dari tingkat provinsi hingga kecamatan. Menguatnya etnisitas ini tidak lama, karena penguasa Orde Baru melarang etnis sebagai basis politik. Lebih tragis lagi, ’Dayak’ digolongkan sebagai ’terisolasi’ dan ’primitif’ satu kelompok dengan etnis Papua di Irian Jaya dan etnis lain yang sebelumnya sangat mewarnai politik lokal (Bertrand, 2004: 54). Di Kalimantan Barat, selama Orde Baru tidak ada seorangpun gubernur, berasal dari etnis Dayak. Politik marginalisasi etnisitas ini menyebabkan gumpalan kekesalan dan dendam atas etnis Jawa. Sementara, karena migran terbesar dari Jawa yang mencolok adalah suku Madura, maka dalam kekerasan 1996-7, 1999 dan 20001 kekesalan etnis Dayak diarahkan ke satu etnis migran, yaitu Madura, yang juga dianggap representasi dari Jawa.

Akar konflik juga berasal dari politik berbasis agama yang dimainkan oleh pemerintah pusat. Agama menjadi identitas sangat kuat di Maluku sejak masa kolonial, ketika Kristen Maluku mendapat tempat lebih baik dibandingkan Muslim Maluku. Muslim termarjinalisasi. Banyak orang Maluku menjadi Kristen karena proses misionari dan kesempatan pekerjaan yang lebih baik sebagai pegawai administrasi pemerintah Belanda dan anggota tentara. Setelah kemerdekaan beberapa tokoh Maluku yang tidak puas dengan kebijakan Sukarno membentuk RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan), khususnya setelah sistem serikat, mereka tidak mendapat tempat lagi di politik. Represi pemerintah atas kekuatan lokal Maluku selalu melalui imaginasi ’Kristen Maluku mendukung gerakan RMS’. Karena itu, selama Orde Baru jabatan Gubernur selalui dijabat oleh militer dan non lokal, hingga 1992, Akib Latuconsina, guvernur sipil pertama, dan asli Maluku. Tetapi marginalisasi politik agama semakin menguat, karena elit Kristen yang semula menjabat posisi penting diberbagai departemen di pemerintah daerah, digantikan dengan calon baru yang Muslim. Karena itu, ketika Orde Baru runtuh kerusuhan muncul dengan isu awal ’pulangkan BBM’-etnis pendatang yang dominan di Maluku. Isu ini tidak lama berubah menjadi Kristen melawan Muslim melalui identitas gereja dan masjid yang dipicu melalui isu maupun pembakaran tempat ibadah ini. Agama menjadi identitas penting tidak hanya di politik tetapi juga di masyarakat. Isu Muslim menguasai ekonomi Maluku, atau Kristen termarjinalisasi dalam perdagangan tidak relevan, karena pengusaha China dan konglomerat dari Jawa masih menjadi penguasa utama ekonomi di Maluku.

Sementara Aceh, representasi etnis yang ’memberontak’ selama puluhan tahun menjadi korban represi tentara. Status daerah istimewa tidak berdampak positif terhadap perekonomian dan perdamaian di Aceh selama Orde Baru. Bahkan pemerintah pasca Suharto memberi status otonomi belum berdampak signifikan, hingga dicapai kesepakatan damai integrasi GAM ke Republik Indonesia difasilitasi oleh Aceh Monitory Mission (AMM) setelah tragedi tsunami yang menimbulkan korban ribuan orang. Otonomi khusus menjadi status sangat urgen dalam menyelesaikan koflik yang panjang di Aceh. Diperkenalkan sistem baru, otonomi daerah pasca Orde Baru, telah mewarnai babak baru kesempatan luas bagi etnis lokal, kekuatan daerah untuk terlibat langsung melalui mekanisme demokrasi. Karena itu, Bertrand melihat bahwa otonomi daerah akan menjadi instrumen sangat penting untuk rekonsiliasi nasional, perdamaian yang lebih baik. Faksi-faksi yang sebelumnya berebut melalui kekerasan, kini memiliki peran langsung untuk terlibat dalam politik lokal, dengan mekanisme demokrasi***

Resolusi Konflik: Pengalaman Muslim Indonesia

2008-06-01T06:21:00.000-07:00

Badrus Sholeh

Tulisan berikut akan melihat bagaimana pengalaman tokoh Islam di Indonesia dalam mencegah terjadinya kekerasan dan konflik. Kekerasan dan konflik dalam konteks ini terdiri dari banyak wilayah: sesama Muslim, etnis dan agama, masyarakat dan negara dan antar institusi sosial-politik. Kerusuhan sering melibatkan sesama Muslim yang berbeda aliran, atau Muslim mayoritas dan Muslim minoritas. Dalam masalah etnis dan agama, kerusuhan atau ketegangan melibatkan Islam dan etnis minoritas, misalnya antara Muslim dan etnis Tionghoa. Sementara kerusuhan antara masyarakat dan negara disebabkan oleh kasus perdata yang melibatkan masyarakat dan perusahaan milik negara, misalnya advokasi dilakukan oleh beberapa ustaz muda dari Pesantren Salafiah Syafi’iyah Situbondo dalam memediasi masyarakat lokal di Situbondo yang digusur paksa oleh PTPN XII, perkebunan tebu milik perusahaan pemerintah. Tokoh agama juga dalam banyak kesempatan menengahi ketegangan antar organisasi Islam, dan antar partai berbasis masyarakat Muslim.

Riset yang dilakukan oleh LP3ES terhadap sepuluh pesantren di Indonesia di lima provinsi: Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, Sulawesi Selatan dan Nusa Tenggara Barat pada kurun waktu 2004 sampai 2005, yang disempurnakan menjadi buku berjudul Budaya Damai Komunitas Pesantren, terbit pada bulan Januari 2007 menunjukkan bahwa banyak tokoh agama – dalam konteks ini Islam- yang telah berperan dalam conflict prevention [pencegahan konflik] dan conflict resolution [resolusi konflik]. Pencegahan konflik berarti bahwa tokoh agama secara aktif melakukan upaya mencegah terjadinya kekerasan, kerusuhan dan konflik baik pada komunitasnya maupun ditempat lain. Partisipasi tokoh agama sangat mempengaruhi situasi damai di masyarakat karena mereka dijadikan ‘contoh’ dan ‘cermin’dalam melakukan sesuatu. Diantaranya adalah peran Tuan Guru Turmudzi Badruddin, di Lombok, Nusa Tenggara Barat pada Januari 2001 menghimbau masyarakat Muslim untuk tidak ikut tabligh akbar di Mataram yang menyerukan pengiriman laskar ke Maluku, sebagai aksi solidaritas kerusuhan yang dianggap menewaskan banyak Muslim Maluku. Di Mataram, peristiwa ini disebut ‘Kudatuli’. Konflik Maluku memang memberi dampak besar terhadap hubungan antar agama atau perubahan sikap Muslim terhadap non Muslim di Indonesia. Dalam kurun tahun 2000-2002, berbagai tabligh akbar dan khutbah Jum’at di Jawa, Sulawesi Selatan, NTB, Sumatra dan wilayah lain di Indonesia menyerukan solidaritas atas Muslim di Maluku dan Poso.

Dalam kerusuhan Mei 1998, ketika sikap anti-Tionghoa memuncak di Indonesia menjelang dan sesudah lengsernya Suharto, penguasa Orde Baru, berbagai tokoh pesantren juga menyerukan kepada santri dan komunitasnya untuk tidak ikut terprovokasi melakukan kerusakan dan pembakaran. Diantaranya adalah tokoh pesantren Al Muayyad, dan Pesantren Al Mukmin. Mereka menghimbau santri untuk tidak ikut dalam kerusuhan Mei 1998, yang menurut riset departemen agama, menyebabkan kerugian lebih dari 18 milyard rupiah. Tetapi perlu mendapat catatan khusus bahwa santri dan alumni pesantren diberbagai tempat banyak juga yang mudah terprovokasi untuk melakukan perusakan dan pembakaran atas aset toko, rumah dan mobil yang dianggap milik Tionghoa. Di Solo, salah satu obyek yang menjadi incaran amuk massa adalah rumah milik ‘kroni’ Suharto, yaitu Harmoko. Menurut temuan ormas Islam, bahwa dalam berbagai kerusuhan pada akhir dan pasca runtuhnya Orde Baru terdapat kelompok yang terorganisir dalam memprovokasi massa. Pada kerusuhan Situbondo dan Tasikmalaya 1996, Gusdur menyebut peran ‘Naga Hijau’ sebagai kelompok yang menggerakkan massa untuk melakukan membakaran terhadap rumah dan toko milik masyarakat Tionghoa dan kantor pemerintah, khususnya pos polisi, dan sekolah Kristen. Sayangnya, berbagai riset atas temuan peran pihak ketiga dalam berbagai kerusuhan dan konflik seringkali tidak tuntas, khususnya jika ditemukan keterlibatan kelompok tingkat tinggi, yang menyangkut elit Indonesia. Keberadaan Komnas HAM dan Komnas Perempuan bisa menjembatani ‘ketakutan’ masyarakat dalam menyelesaikan berbagai kerusuhan yang melibatkan kelompok elit. Tentu saja dibutuhkan independensi yang kuat atas suatu institusi penegakan Hak Asasi Manusia yang netral dan tidak tersentuh oleh eksekutif dan legislatif, atau institusi pemerintah lain. Terpilihnya sebelas anggota utama Komnas HAM pada 21 Juni 2007 diharapkan oleh masyarakat yang lelah menghadapi tekanan berulang kali pasca runtuhnya Orde Baru. Spirit demokrasi dan pemerintah yang bersih (clean governance) yang mendapat dukungan besar masyarakat akan menjadi modal besar untuk membangun masyarakat Indonesia yang kuat, independen, dan damai. Modal sosial yang besar dan kuatnya institusi demokrasi merupakan landasan terciptanya masyarakat Indonesia yang dinamis. Tantangan terberat adalah masih banyaknya tingkat kemiskinan akibat krisis moneter yang panjang. Dalam pandangan Dr. Budiono, dalam pidato guru besarnya di UGM, menyebutkan bahwa apabila tekanan kemiskinan ini tidak diatasi dalam waktu cepat maka fondasi sosial dan demokrasi akan runtuh dalam kurun dua dekade, dan menjadi ancaman terbentuknya masyarakat anarkhis dan anti-demokrasi.

Anniversary of Aceh-Indonesia Peace Accord

2006-10-09T05:48:00.000-07:00

A hundred thousand Acehnese attended anniversary of Acehnese Fredom Movement and Indonesian government peaceful accord.

Pluralism -- Beyond Unity in Diversity

2006-10-09T05:29:00.000-07:00

The Sanskrit words in the state motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, which has been loosely translated as Unity in Diversity, will no doubt be invoked as Indonesia marks the 60th anniversary of the proclamation of independence this week. Six decades is a long journey for a nation whose main trait, ever since its inception in 1945, is its diversity.

That we have stayed as one nation through all this time, in spite of forces that constantly threaten to tear us apart, is certainly worth celebrating.

But let us not forget that it has taken a lot of efforts by people with such diverse backgrounds -- from culture, ethnicity and religion to language, tradition and custom -- to make Indonesia what it is today. Most of us probably do it subconsciously. Others, because they are more exposed to diversity for one reason or another know that they have had to work extra hard to make unity in diversity work (The Jakarta Post, October 9, 2006).

Poso Bomb

2006-09-19T01:59:00.000-07:00

In this two week, there are bombings exploded in Poso killed two people. According to the head of Police that the bombs were not related to the changing of Tibo and colleagues execution. However, they will be executed on friday early morning (Kompas, 19 September 2006).

Perdamaian di Poso

2006-08-06T20:55:00.000-07:00

Poso adalah salah satu prototipe wilayah di Indonesia yang sangat plural baik dalam perspektif agama maupun etnis, yang sangat rentan terbelah. Konflik Poso sejak 1998 yang menimbulkan kematian ribuan penduduk dan ratusan ribu lainnya dipaksa mengungsi (IDPs) menjadi bukti atas teori ini. Keragaman Poso barangkali bisa dibandingkan dengan Republik Chechnya dan Yugoslavia. Donald L. Horowitz dalam essainya Democracy in Divided Societies (dalam Diamond & Platner, 1994: 35) menyetakan bahwa terbelahnya wilayah negara-negara di Eropa Timur baik secara agama maupun etnis telah berhasil dikendalikan dengan mekanisme demokrasi. Meskipun Horowitz mengakui bahwa ketidakpuasan anta relit sering menimbulkan konflik baru (1994: 37). Kini empat tahun pasca perjanjian Malino, Desember 2001, terror dan bom masih sering terjadi ditengah upaya perdamaian yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah dan masyarakat sipil di Poso. Menurut studi Luthfi Ashari (2005), peneliti World Bank, atas gerakan perdamaian sejak Malino I hingga upaya kaum muda Muslim dan Kristen pada 2004. Mereka tidak terpengaruh dengan derasnya tekanan friksi pada saat berlangsungnya Pemilihan langsung. Tetapi bom sempat meledak di Tentena persis sebulan menjelang Pemilihan Bupati dan Wakil Bupati, 28 Mei 2005, yang mengakibatkan 22 korban meninggal dan puluhan lainnya luka-luka. Beberapa bom terus meledak menjelang hari H pemilihan. Dalam minggu terakhir, tiga bulan setelah pemilihan Bupati upaya perdamaian terus dilakukan lebih masif. Minggu, 18 September masyarakat Muslim dan Kristen merayakan perdamaian dengan ‘Madero’ bersama. Bom meledak empat orang luka berat. Peristiwa ini memunculkan pertanyaan apakah demokrasi kontrapuduktif dengan proses perdamaian?

Seiring dengan argumen Horowitz, Timothy D. Sisk (1998: 139) menyatakan bahwa ketika pemerintah menjadi demokratis dan inklusif maka konflik akan bisa dihindari karena faksi-faksi (minoritas) tidak perlu menyulut kekerasan untuk menarik perhatian. Argumen ini telah terbukti di Kosovo, dimana pembagian kekuasaan (power-sharing) telah menjadi mekanisme perdamaian masyarakat Albania dan Serbia di Balkan. Ini termasuk kesuksesan perdamaian di Bosnia yang sangat beragam etnis dan agama.

Dua pendekatan dibutuhkan dalam pembagian kekuasaan ini: pendekatan pengembangan-terbatas kelompok (group building-block approach) dan pendekatan penyatuan (integrative approach). Dalam pendekatan pertama, para pemimpin/ elit kelompok etnis (dan agama) terakomodasi dalam pusat politik dan dijamin dalam hak-hak minoritas dan otonomi kelompok. Garansi ini tertuang dalam konstitusi, diperkuat dengan legal system dan kesadaran yang tangguh. Bosnia dan Libanon berhasil meredam potensi konflik antar komunitas berbeda agama dan etnis dalam system politik dimana representasi dan otonomi kelompok dijamin konstitusi. Pendekatan ini hampir bertentangan dengan pendekatan berikutnya: integrative approach, yaitu upaya menghindari representasi kelompok etnis dan agama dengan mengutamakan kepentingan persatuan dan kesatuan, hidup bersatu dalam perbedaan. Upaya ini berhasil di Afrika Selatan dengan konstitusi 1993. Tetapi pendekatan ini perlu didukung elit nasional yang kharismatik, bersih, berwibawa dan adil. Magnis-Suseno (1999: 39) secara sistematis membagi aspek legitimasi kekuasaan dalam tiga hal pokok: legalitas, legitimasi demokratis dan legitimasi moral. Ketiganya dimiliki oleh elit politik pasca apartheid di Afrika Selatan.

Dalam tingkat tertentu pendekatan kedua dicoba implementasikan dalam kebijakan Orde Baru, dengan terus-menerus menafikan pluralitas lokal, dan menyeragamkan nasional. Homogenisasi keragaman gagal membendung derasnya ekspresi lokalitas yang kaya dan potensial di Indonesia. Sementara pendekatan pertama bisa menjadi alternatif dalam konteks pemilihan langsung dalam pemilu 2004 dan Pilkada 2005. Bagaimana kemungkinannya, khususnya di Poso?

Legitimasi Pilkada Damai

Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dilandasi dengan dua sumber konstitusi: Undang-Undang Pemerintah Daerah 2004 (UU RI No. 32 Tahun 2004) dan Peraturan tentang Pemilihan Kepala Daerah 2005 (PP RI No. 6 Tahun 2005) tentang Pemilihan, Pengesahan Pengangkatan, dan Pemberhentian kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah. Semangat konstitusi ini adalah Otonomi Daerah, yang juga menjadi bagian dari perangkat peace building untuk masyarakat pasca konflik yang plural dan beragam. Dalam konteks ini, dibutuhkan kekuatan kelompok kelas menengah yang mampu menjembatani kepentingan politik dan aspirasi rakyat. Pilkada merupakan instrumen strategis bagi rakyat untuk menentukan masa depan mereka secara langsung dengan memilih pimpinan daerah yang adil, akuntabel dan pro-rakyat. Hambatan atas Pilkada dalam masyarakat pasca konflik adalah terbatasnya informasi yang seimbang, dan jaminan stabilitas keamanan yang tidak mampu dikontrol secara maksimal. Ketakutan rakyat dan sulitnya kehidupan ekonomi pasca konflik menyuburkan praktik mobilisasi massa dan eksploitasi suara untuk kepentingan kelompok yang kuat secara kapital dan tidak mengutamakan kepentingan rakyat secara luas. Isu-isu yang tidak sensitive seringkali dimunculkan dengan menyudutkan kelompok tertentu dan sekedar mengangkat solidaritas kelompok terbatas. Ini tentu sangan kontraproduktif dalam semangat perdamaian.

Hasil pemilihan umum (PEMILU) 2004, merubah peta kekuatan politik lokal di Poso. Dominasi Partai Golkar digeser oleh Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS) pada Pemilu 2004. Partai pendatang baru berbasis Kristen tersebut, meraup enam (6) kursi dari 30 kursi yang ada di DPRD Poso. Sementara Partai Golkar hanya bisa mendapatkan 4 kursi, sama jumlahnya dengan kursi yang diperoleh Partai Patriot Pancasila. Sementara hasil Pilkada 2005, sebagaimana yang diprediksi sebelumnya, Calon yang diusung Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS), Piet Inkriwang dan Muthalib Rimi, mengungguli lawan politiknya untuk memperebutkan 01 dan 02 Poso, periode lima tahun mendatang, dengan perolehan suara yang sangat fantastis. Dari 100.765 suara yang masuk ke KPUD, Piet Inkriwang/Muthalib Rimi memperoleh 42.718 suara, Frans Suwolino/Kahar Latjare 20.995 suara, Edi Bungkundapu/Awad Al-Amri 13.623 suara, Muin Pusadan/Os Walenta 13.013 suara, dan Dede K.Atmawijaya/Lies Sigilipu 10.416 suara.

Masa Depan Poso

Proses demokrasi dalam Pilkada langsung ini menjadi taruhan atas konteks Otonomi Daerah, apakah menguat atau sebaliknya memperlemah potensi-potensi daerah. Ini bergantung atas mekanisme demokrasi yang dibangun oleh partai-partai politik, dan pengawasan kelas menengah masyarakat sipil (civil society). Penguatan masyarakat sipil perlu menjadi perhatian bersama dengan mengutamakan niat baik untuk membangun bersama puing-puing yang runtuh dan keretakan hubungan social pasca konflik. Kebijakan representasi dan atau kesatuan-persatuan bisa dijadikan alternatif dengan menggabungkan kearifan local yang dimiliki masyarakat Poso. Terpilihnya Piet-Wahap yang didukung partai terkuat, PDS memunculkan dua hal: pertama, demokrasi langsung di Poso tetap memenangkan calon dari partai terkuat dan dipilih oleh komunitas terbesar. Kedua, kesadaran untuk hidup berdampingan antara elit Muslim dan Kristen tercerminkan dalam setiap kandidat. Tantangan terbesar pasca Pemilu 2004 dan Pilkada 2005 adalah apakah harapan masyarakat atas kandidat terpilih telah menjadi pilihan yang legitimate dalam tiga kekuatan dasar: legalitas, legitimasi demokrasi dan legitimasi moral, yang akan menjadi perangkat untuk mengarahkan Poso dari pengalaman pahit kerusuhan menjadi masyarakat plural yang harmonis, damai dan demokratis. Legitimasi moral atau kekuatan etis politik nampaknya masih menjadi pertanyaan paling mendasar, yang berlaku tidak hanya bagi partai politik tetapi setiap unsur kekuasaan lokal. (Penulis: Badrus Sholeh, Peneliti Pusat Studi Asia Tenggara, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, email: bsholeh@yahoo.com).

***

Islamic Party in 2004 Election

2006-04-14T22:22:00.000-07:00

Media Indonesia, Opini Jum'at, 12 Maret 2004 00:00 WIB
Daya Tahan Partai Islam untuk Pemilu 2004

DALAM Pemilu 2004 ini, setidaknya ada tujuh partai Islam, baik berdasar Islam yakni Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR), Partai Persatuan Nahdhatul Ummah Indonesia (PNUI), maupun partai berkonstituen muslim berasas nasional, yaitu Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) dan Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), yang siap bertanding untuk Pemilu 2004. Akankah mereka mengulangi 'kegagalan' lima tahun lalu (Pemilu 1999) di mana banyak partai Islam yang terpuruk, jauh di bawah perolehan partai nasionalis dan sekuler. Apakah umat Islam yang mayoritas pemilih sudah bergeser ke 'kanan'?

Pesantren, Conflict and Peace

2006-04-13T21:07:00.000-07:00

Republika Indonesian Daily, Rabu, 23 Februari 2005

Pesantren, Konflik, dan Peace Building

Badrus Sholeh
Peneliti LP3ES dan Dosen UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta

Temu Ulama (Teungku) Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) pada 14-16 Februari 2005 telah menghasilkan beberapa rencana kerja strategis untuk mengatasi NAD pascagempa dan tsunami. Di antaranya menumbuhkan lagi peran dayah dan meunasah dalam proses recovery, memperkuat ekonomi kerakyatan, dan mendukung berbagai potensi yang masuk untuk pembangunan ulang NAD secara komprehensif. Di tempat terpisah (Jakarta), beberapa Teungku Dayah juga bekerjasama dengan Yayasan Baitul Hikmah Republika untuk memperkuat pendidikan pesantren di NAD. Ini bagian dari peran Republika dalam pemulihan Aceh, khususnya dibidang pendidikan agama dan pemberdayaan masyarakat (Republika, 18 Februari 2005).

Pendidikan adalah aspek paling strategis bagi pemulihan NAD pascabencana tsunami. Ini untuk mengurangi besarnya keterputusan generasi NAD yang tangguh akibat bencana. Tulisan berikut akan menganalisis peran dayah atau umumnya di Indonesia disebut pesantren dalam pemulihan masyarakat pascakonflik dan bencana. Beberapa konflik (kerusuhan) komunal yang terjadi baik di Situbondo (10 Oktober 1996), Tasikmalaya (26 Desember 1996), Maluku dan Poso (1999-2002), Mataram (17 Januari 2000), maupun bencana tsunami Aceh (26 Desember 2004) menempatkan kiai (Jawa Timur dan Tengah), ajengan (Jawa Barat), guruta (Sulawesi), tuan guru (NTB), dan teungku (Aceh) dalam inti proses rekonsiliasi, recovery, dan pemulihan konflik dan bencana.

Fenomena ini jauh dari perhatian studi pesantren yang masih berkutat pada argumen Geertz (1968) tentang cultural broker pesantren, Horikoshi (1987) tentang peran pesantren sebagai agen perubahan social, dan Zamakhsyari (1994) tentang tradisi pesantren. Beberapa peneliti studi pesantren belakangan juga masih berkutat seputar kajian ketiga pilar utama ini, misalnya Abdurrahman Masud (2004) tentang tradisi intelektual pesantren, juga peneliti lulusan Arizota State Univeristy Lukens-Bull (2004) tentang peaceful jihad dari pesantren. Indonesia dalam satu dekade terakhir masa transisi mengalami goncangan kerusuhan, krisis ekonomi dan bencana, yang menimbulkan keputusasaan dan perubahan drastis tatanan sosial menempatkan komunitas pesantren tidak sekedar cultural broker, agen perubahan, juga pusat intelektualisme, tetapi telah lekat dengan gerakan praksis filantropis-religius.

Pusat Studi Konflik dan Perdamaian, LP3ES dan Forum Sebangsa selama enam bulan (September 1994-Januari 2005) melakukan studi lapangan sepuluh pesantren di lima provinsi: Jawa (Timur, Tengah, Barat), Sulawesi Selatan, dan NTB tentang bagaimana peran komunitas pesantren dalam menumbuhkan peaceful culture (budaya damai). Riset ini untuk mengisi kekosongan studi pesantren yang tidak menjangkau fenomena kekerasan, krisis, kerusuhan, dan perubahan sosial politik Indonesia pascaruntuhnya Orde Baru. Tim peneliti LP3ES menemukan besarnya peran ulama dalam proses rekonsiliasi dan pemulihan masyarakat pasca konflik. Bahkan, mereka secara aktif mencoba melakukan upaya preventif dalam suasana chaos masyarakat akibat simpang siur isu. Fenomena ini mirip dengan apa yang ditemukan Appleby (2000) dalam mengamati peran agamawan Budha dalam proses gerakan antikekerasan dan demokratisasi di Kamboja melawan hegemoni Khmer Merah.

Posisi pesantren
Konflik komunal yang melibatkan peran dekat pesantren dalam perdamaian di antaranya adalah kerusuhan Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Maluku, Poso, dan Mataram antara 1996-2002. Riset tentang kerusuhan Situbondo telah dilakukan oleh Gerakan Pemuda Ansor, yang melihat adanya konspirasi dibalik peristiwa ini. Alasan utama adalah kondisi masyarakat Situbondo yang santri, dan selama puluhan tahun tidak terjadi persoalan serius hubungan antarkomunitas berbeda agama. Sedangkan Peneliti UGM dan Litbang Depag menolak adanya teori konspirasi ini. Mereka lebih melihat kondisi sosiologis masyarakat Situbondo yang memicu terjadinya kerusuhan ini. Masyarakat Situbondo mengalami proses alienasi dan diskriminasi pembangunan ekonomi (Tochah, 2002). Kasus ini berawal dari proses peradilan terhadap pemuda bernama Muhammad Sholeh atas tuduhan penghinaan terhadap Islam dan tokoh agama (almarhum KH As'ad Syamsul Arifin) pada Kamis, 10 Oktober 1996. Dampak dari keputusan peradilan ini menimbulkan protes keras massa, yang dalam waktu sekitar tujuh jam melakukan pembakaran dan pengrusakan bangunan.

Korban kasus ini adalah lima orang dan kerusakan bangunan di antaranya 22 gereja dan rumah kebaktian, beberapa sekolah, rumah makan, gedung bioskop, klenteng, dan mini market. Pascakerusuhan ini KH Ahmad Fawaid, putra KH As'ad Syamsul Arifin, memobilisasi santri untuk mengamankan kondisi dan menjaga gereja. Ini diawali dengan keberanian Kiai Fawaid mengundang para tokoh lintas agama untuk melakukan refleksi di pesantren Salafiah Syafi'iyah Situbondo. Dalam dua bulan kemudian, 26 Desember 1996, terjadi lagi kerusuhan komunal di Tasikmalaya, Jawa Barat. Isunya hampir mirip dengan kerusuhan Situbondo, yaitu protes massa Muslim terhadap ketidakadilan perlakuan atas tokoh agama oleh aparat pemerintah. Kalau pemicu awal di Situbondo adalah keputusan hakim Pengadilan Negeri, tetapi di Tasikmalaya adalah perilaku aparat kepolisian. Kerugian atas kerusuhan Tasikmalaya sekitar Rp 80 miliar, atau tujuh belas kali lebih besar dari kerusuhan Situbondo.

Ini ungkapan ketidakpuasan masyarakat Muslim atas kebijakan ekonomi Orde Baru yang diskriminatif, dan arogansi TNI dan kepolisian terhadap eksistensi masyarakat sipil (baca: komunitas pesantren). Dalam proses rekonsiliasi pascakerusuhan, para ulama pesantren kemudian secara aktif berusaha menenangkan massa, baik secara langsung di tengah massa maupun melalui pengajian. Dalam jangka panjang, kiai-kiai pesantren mengadakan berbagai pertemuan dengan masyarakat berbeda agama, aparat keamanan dan pemerintah daerah.

Kerusuhan Mataram merupakan dampak dari setahun kerusuhan Maluku yang tidak berhasil diredam oleh pihak keamanan. Ahad malam, 16 Januari 2000, isu akan diadakannya pengajian akbar membahas kerusuhan Maluku telah menyebar di kalangan masyarakat NTB. Tokoh-tokoh agama dan masyarakat telah memperingatkan kepada kaum muda untuk tidak mengikuti pertemuan ini. TGH Turmudzi Badruddin, tokoh yang sangat disegani di NTB, misalnya melakukan peredaman dengan mengumumkan secara terbuka lewat pesantren dan masjid di Bagu, bagi masyarakat Muslim untuk tidak pergi mengikuti pengajian ''provokatif'' ini.

TGH Tumudzi melihat aksi solidaritas Islam melalui tabligh akbar lebih banyak unsur agenda politiknya dari pada manfaatnya untuk umat Islam. TGH Turmudzi mencoba mengurangi dampak negatif dari tablig akbar ini. Alhamdulillah, sebagian mereka ada yang tidak jadi berangkat dan tapi ada juga yang berangkat. Dan ternyata benar hasilnya mereka bakar-bakar gereja dan lain-lain. (TGH Turmudzi, dari wawancara, Bagu, 3 Oktober 2004). Senin pagi, 17 Januari 2000, dilakukan rapat akbar Muslim NTB di lapangan umum. Pengajian publik ini merupakan refleksi atas kekerasan yang terjadi di Indonesia, khususnya di Maluku dalam satu tahun 1999. Di akhir pertemuan terbesar Muslim NTB ini, terdapat seorang pembicara yang menurut pihak panitia tidak masuk dalam daftar pembicara yang diagendakan menyinggung pentingnya persatuan umat Islam membalas kekejaman atas Muslim Maluku (Kompas, 19 Januari 2000). Massa yang terbakar emosinya kemudian bubar, dan dalam perjalanan membuat kerusuhan dan membakar gereja, dan beberapa sekolah Kristen.

Apa yang dilakukan kiai di Situbondo, ajengan di Tasikmalaya, dan tuan guru di Mataram dalam menangani masyarakat pascakerusuhan, tidak jauh berbeda dengan komitmen teungku dayah dan meunasah dalam membantu pemulihan NAD pascabencana tsunami. Para teungku tidak hanya aktif dalam memperkuat pendidikan agama, tetapi juga upaya-upaya lain yang strategis untuk masyarakat.

Fakta ini meruntuhkan argumen Johan Galtung (1996:6) bahwa agama dan ideologi yang memiliki peran saling membunuh antarkomunitas berbeda agama dengan mengatasnamakan Tuhan masing-masing. Tetapi fenomena sebaliknya di Indonesia. Komunitas agama secara sukarela membantu proses perdamaian, baik sebelum terjadinya kerusuhan atau bencana, maupun sesudahnya. Mereka bahkan melepaskan baju agama, demi membantu masyarakat pascakonflik dan bencana alam. Kasus gempa Nabire dan Aceh menjadi saksi betapa terjadi pergeseran peran tokoh agama kedalam persoalan bangsa dengan karya-karya sosial. Wallahu a'lam.

© 2005 Hak Cipta oleh Republika Online

Most Indonesian Muslims Reject Islamic Law

2006-04-13T19:50:00.000-07:00

'Most Indonesian Muslims reject Islamic law'

The Straits Times
July 31, 2003

By Salim Osman

MUSLIMS in Indonesia are against the creation of an Islamic state partly because of the spectre of the hudud - the Islamic penal code that prescribes punishment for various religious offences, says an Indonesian academic.
Mr Badrus Sholeh, a senior lecturer at the State Institute for Islamic Studies campus in Eastern Sulawesi, said Muslims were also not in favour of a theocracy for Indonesia. This is because, despite living in the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, Indonesians are generally moderates and are tolerant
of other faiths.
Speaking at a seminar in Singapore on the Islamic state, he said that calls for the enforcement of syariah laws and the setting up of an Islamic state were made by hardliners who were in the minority and did not command a wide
following.

'Most Indonesian Muslims support nationalist and moderate Muslim figures, not the radical ones,' he said at the session organised by Singapore's Institute of South-east Asian Studies on Monday. Any talk about an Islamic state, he added, invariably brings to mind the issue of the hudud, a part of the syariah law that prescribes stoning for
adulterers and the amputation of limbs for thieves, as applied in the Middle East.

'Indonesian Muslims generally reject the enforcement of the syariah law based on the Middle Eastern model.'
They have reservations over the hudud as there is no consensus among Muslim theologians about certain punishments under the religious penal code, he said.
He believes the hudud, as practised in the Middle East, is based on the interpretation of Ibn Taimiyah, the 13th century Muslim scholar from Arabia, and to
a certain extent, the ideas of Maududi, the 20th century Muslim thinker from Pakistan.

'We should differentiate between what is syariah and what is Middle Eastern culture,' he said.

Stressing that many Indonesian Muslims did not support the hudud, he recalled that local Muslims were afraid when the radical Islamic group Laskar Jihad stoned an adulterer to death in Ambon in 2001. 'Local Muslims saw it as an act of violence and of being inhuman,' he later told The Straits Times.

Mr Badrus conceded that there is growing interest in Islam and the religious law among Indonesian Muslims because of the perception that it could be the answer to the problems of corruption, nepotism and other vices that prevail in the post-Suharto era.

'These calls for the syariah law are strictly political in nature and not religious.' This interest in Islamic law was also reflected in a survey done by a research group in Jakarta in 2001. It found that almost 61 per cent of Muslims were in favour of the syariah.

But when the respondents were asked detailed questions about enforcement of the hudud, only 30 per cent supported it, noted the academic. He said the plethora of Muslim parties in the country after the fall of Suharto would not be a strong political force. He also ruled out an increase in support for these parties in elections next
year. Most of the radical Islamic parties did not do well in the 1999 polls, he noted. This pattern is likely to continue next year, with only the Justice Party improving on its past record, but at the expense of other Muslim-based parties
like the National Awakening Party and the United Development Party.

There is little chance of Muslim parties capturing power because they are not a monolithic bloc, he added.